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CREATING TRUE BELIEVERS: PUTTING
MACRO THEORY INTO PRACTICE
MINNA J. KOTKIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Robert Condlin published an article, now somewhat no-
torious in clinical circles, entitled "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The
Law School Clinic and Political Critique.1 There he attacked in-house
clinical programs for failing to provide a political critique of law-
yering. Political critique, he suggested, requires a critical theory, de-
fined as "views on the nature of a fair and just legal system and the
role of lawyer practices in operating and improving it."' 2 The para-
mount goal of clinical instruction is such critique, and without it, clin-
ics "will remain relegated to training tasks not considered important
enough over the long run by a university law school."' 3 Condlin argued
that the typical clinic cannot appropriately engage in this critical en-
deavor because of design and resource limitations. He suggested that
externship programs supervised by full time faculty provide a better
vehicle for students to learn how to think critically about lawyering.
"Tastes Great" was viewed as heresy by many clinical educators. 4
Unfortunately, Condlin's legitimate concerns about the relega-
tion of clinical teaching to trade school-like "skills instruction" were
overshadowed by his condemnation of in-house clinics-still a sensi-
tive issue in law school politics. 5 This article both follows from and
challenges Condlin's critique. I argue that the lawyering methodology
* Professor of Law and Director, Federal Litigation Program, Brooklyn Law School. I
want to thank Jennifer Sinton for her invaluable research assistance and to acknowledge
the support of Brooklyn Law School's summer research stipend program. Thanks also to
the participants in the UCLA/IALS Fourth International Clinical Conference, where I
presented a draft of this article; to my former colleague in the clinic, Liz Cooper; and to my
writing group-Stacy Caplow, Susan Herman, Nan Hunter, and Liz Schneider-for their
support and feedback.
1 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986).
2 Id. at 48-49.
3 Id. at 45.
4 Indeed, Condlin was optimistically understated when he recently noted that the arti-
cle "might have been read more receptively if it had been given a different title." Robert J.
Condlin, Learning from Colleagues: A Case Study in the Relationship Between "Academic"
and "Ecological" Clinical Legal Education, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 337, 338-39 n.4 (1997).
5 It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into the "location" debate. In my view,
while an in-house clinic is not the only possible site to explore theory, there is certainly no
better place. I say this from my perspective as an in-house clinical teacher and without
support or argument.
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taught in most clinical programs is premised upon a critical theory.
The problem is that we have not developed a methodology for system-
atically articulating and teaching the theory.
In what I hope is a constructive manner, this article addresses
how we can put theory into our teaching and our vision of practice.
Part II considers why legal theory makes a difference in clinical teach-
ing, and distinguishes micro theory from macro theory in the teaching
of lawyering methodology. In Parts III and IV, I explore the parallel
histories of critical legal theory and clinical education, and summarize
those components of critical theory that most aptly find their way into
our lawyering paradigms. In Part V, using examples of several skill
components that cut across most clinical programs-interviewing,
counseling, development of case theory, and negotiation-I analyze
the underlying micro and macro theories, and make suggestions for
how these skills can be taught from a more theoretical foundation. In
Part VI, I offer some thoughts for the skeptical reader. I conclude by
suggesting that we embrace the idea of "critical lawyering" as an over-
arching paradigm for our teaching that will serve the purpose of imbu-
ing skills instruction with a solid theoretical foundation.
II. WHY THEORY?
Clinical legal educators have always given lip service to the prop-
osition that experiential learning will change the study of law to inte-
grate theory and practice. I suggest, however, that our efforts in this
direction have been stymied by a concentration on the teaching of
skills without theoretical context. Our students are provided with lit-
tle foundation from which to understand what we hope to teach them
about law and lawyering. The "theory-practice spiral' 6 that we envi-
sion as the optimal clinical experience may not be turning in the right
direction.
In its formative years, clinical legal education was rooted in prac-
tice. Students worked with legal services and public interest lawyers
to gain "relevant" legal experience in a time of progressive political
consciousness. 7 As these externship experiences were formalized and
6 Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Edu-
cation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1617 (1991)(coining this phrase, and suggesting that per-
ceiving a theory-practice dichotomy erases the dialectical nature of the relationship
between theory and practice).
7 See Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical Education, 19 N.M.
L. REV. 185, 189-91 (1989). See also Gary Bellow & Earl Johnson, Reflections on the Uni-
versity of Southern California Clinical Seminar, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664, 668-69 (1971)(dis-
cussing changes in law students' career patterns and interest in "personal and institutional
involvement in contemporary social problems"); Robert A. Gorman, Clinical Legal Educa-
tion: A Prospectus, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 537, 540 (1971)(noting that most clinical programs
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funds were made available to institutionalize them within the law
schools, it became apparent that clinical practice provided an opportu-
nity to think seriously about what constitutes good lawyering. 8 From
the clinical laboratory, we developed basic lawyering models for inter-
viewing and counseling clients, for planning a representational strat-
egy, for negotiating on behalf of our clients, for representing
community groups.
These lawyering models-or paradigms, to use the terminology of
this conference-represent what I will call micro theory. For example,
when we teach counseling, we present the theory of client centered
decisionmaking, usually through the use of texts such as Binder, Berg-
man, and Price9 or Bastress and Harbaugh. 10 In teaching negotiation,
we may use Getting to Yes 1" to convey the notion of principled bar-
gaining. These works suggest the micro theory for the skills that we
hope our students will develop. We emphasize in our teaching that
the models presented create better lawyering. We patiently explain
that if students understand and follow the models, they will provide
higher quality legal services to their clients.
Most clinical teachers firmly believe this proposition. In my ex-
perience, at least, students are more resistant. For many of them, the
lawyering paradigms that we present are counter-intuitive. Students'
vision of good lawyering, shaped by popular culture, contemplates the
masterful advice-giver and the canny, bluffing, tough negotiator.
Thus, students will often question our paradigms, and seem at least
initially unconvinced by the micro theory that forms the foundation of
the skills being taught. But because they are our students and accus-
tomed to accepting educational hierarchy, they eventually become
more compliant, practicing their reflective listening in simulations
and, probably with less consistency, with their actual clients. Still,
however, how many times do we hear, "But in the real world . . .,"
when we caution that lawyers cannot make decisions for clients, or
insist that a case theory be articulated?
I worry that much of what we teach only penetrates to a limited
assigned students to work for legal aid and legal services offices).
8 See Kotkin, supra note 7, at 191-93 (commenting on the development of an attention
to "how clinicians were using students' practical experiences to achieve generalized learn-
ing about the lawyering process"); Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical
Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 322 & n.3 (1982)(arguing that clinical programs
are justified by the education and experience they provide, and that service is merely a
"welcomed by-product").
9 DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991).
10 ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990).
11 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETING TO YES (2d ed. 1991).
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degree. I imagine our students, when in "the real world" and con-
fronted by norms of practice that have little resemblance to clinical
models, losing the foundations that we worked hard to instill. Why is
it that clinical teachers are true believers in the micro theory that we
teach, while our students may be only temporary converts?
One possible and obvious explanation for this dichotomy is that
clinical teachers have had so many lawyering experiences that demon-
strate the efficacy of our micro theories. For example, we learned in-
tuitively and through trial and error that open ended questions elicit
more information than cross-examination when interviewing a client,
or that a client should not be dissuaded from taking a risk in negotia-
tions even if we would make a different choice.
Thus, while our former students may be temporarily swayed by
practice norms contrary to our micro theories, they will return to the
fold eventually, as experience demonstrates to them the rightness of
our ways. This is the scenario I see on my more optimistic days. On
the others, I imagine my former students reverting to those negative
lawyering images the moment they walk out of the clinic door and
into the infamous "real world." While they may, through experience,
come back to our models, their clinical education failed to accomplish
a major goal: to avoid the lengthy trial and error process of learning
through experience without supervision and directed reflection.
Unfortunately, we cannot convince our students that the clinical
models work through the use of objective studies. We have little in
the way of empirical data to reinforce our intuitive notions of good
lawyering.12 As others have commented, the clinical community has
not created a foundation of study that attempts to provide evidence
that our lawyering models produce better results or even happier cli-
ents.13 Indeed, most of us have no training in the distinct skills neces-
sary for such research, nor the time to invest in such work.
Thus, how do we respond to students' queries about the "whys"
12 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Tran-
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1151-52 (1992)(noting that lawyers' intu-
itions about judge and jury trials are based on perception and not empirical evidence);
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIz.
L. REV. 501, 584, 594 (1990)(discussing the theoretical development of a client-centered
approach to lawyering despite the "inadequate (though improving) state of empirical re-
search on lawyers and clients" and noting that empirical data would help to test the as-
sumptions of the client-centered approach).
13 Vanessa Merton eloquently spoke to this issue at the 1995 AALS Clinical Legal Edu-
cation Workshop in St. Louis, Missouri. See also Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and
Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697, 697 (1992)(reviewing the Binder, Bergman, and Price and
Bastress and Harbaugh books and noting that some of the lawyering models proposed
therein, which the clinical community believes to be effective, are based on assumptions
about clients, lawyers, and the client-lawyer relationship rather than on empirical study).
[Vol. 5:95
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of our lawyering paradigms? I find myself in the position of answer-
ing, "because experience has shown that it works better." Sometimes,
however, the answer is "because I'm the teacher," which is somehow
too reminiscent of the fallback position in my household: "because
I'm the parent." We need something more.
Many clinical teachers are true believers for a reason that goes
beyond experience. Behind our micro theories are unarticulated
macro theories that we do truly believe. These macro theories are
political and jurisprudential. They represent our underlying under-
standing of law and the legal process, of justice and fairness or its ab-
sence. For students to understand the "whys," they need to appreciate
the macro theory of lawyering skills.
That macro theory, I suggest, rests within critical legal theory
scholarship. This is not a novel idea. Any number of clinical writers
have dipped into critical scholarship to elucidate lawyering models. 14
I do not mean to imply that our lawyering paradigms are necessarily
derived from critical legal theory, however. Rather, I see the process
as a symbiotic development along two parallel tracks. Beginning in
late 1970s, both critical scholarship and lawyering scholarship began
to take root in the legal academy. While neither explicitly relied on
the other, the common strands suggest that they find their roots in the
same value structure.
Macro theory is necessary because neither anecdotal experience
nor empirical data (if we were to develop it) provide a sufficient
grounding for our paradigms. And, because the micro theory behind
the paradigms does not-and should not-satisfy our students. These
foundations actually mask the true underpinning of the skills we
teach. I ask students to follow certain models of lawyering because
those models reflect my values, and my values reflect my political un-
derstanding of law and our legal system. As discussed in Part III, criti-
cal legal theory explores those values and political understandings. It
14 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive
Thought and Action: Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Nar-
rative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Repre-
sentation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298
(1992); Clark D. Cunningham, Legal Storytelling: A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about
Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as
an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Louise G.
Trubek, The Worst of Times... And the Best of Times: Lawyering for Poor Clients Today,
22 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 1123 (1995); Louise G. Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People: Revi-
sionist Scholarship and Practice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 983 (1984); Lucie E. White, Seeking
"... the Faces of Otherness. . . ": A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1499 (1992).
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answers the question of "why" with explanations that have substance
and content.
III. A CRITICAL HISTORY
At first glance, it would seem that critical legal studies scholarship
offers little in the way of guidance for those of us who "teach skills"-
a designation that I use here only for purposes of distinguishing be-
tween "stand-up" or traditional teachers, who, of course, also teach
skills, just different ones. In fact, the major critique of CLS15 has been
its lack of practical application to legal problem solving, either from a
doctrinal or a practical perspective. 16 I suggest, however, that a closer
look at CLS principles reveals much that resonates with progressive
practicing lawyers. Indeed, the response to many CLS insights from
this community is that this jurisprudence actually reflects what hap-
pens to disempowered clients and groups in the courts today.
The origin of the CLS movement dates from the same period that
spawned the beginnings of clinical legal education, with much of the
same impetus at its roots. In the 1970s, clinical education sought to
bring a political consciousness to the legal academy. CLS first drew
national attention in 1976 when a group of scholars gathered for a
conference at the University of Wisconsin. 17 Interestingly, the report
of that conference comments upon CLS's roots in practical lawyering.
The intention of the group was to "[speak] to lawyers and academics
in a way that connected theoretical speculation to their daily experi-
ence [of] the law, rather than merely their abstract curiosity."'18 CLS
15 1 use "CLS" broadly to encompass the "traditional" CLS scholarship, as well as other
postmodern theoretical movements. For much of the following summary, I have relied on
an excellent book by my colleague, Gary Minda, which provides a cogent and accessible
summary of postmodern theory. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 123-24 (1995).
16 See id. at 123-24 (discussing the criticisms of Paul Carrington, Owen Fiss, Joel Han-
dler, John Stick, and Harry Edwards); infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing
the criticisms of CLS scholarship). Despite the criticism that CLS lacks practical grounding
and application, Minda notes that "intellectual projects of CLS were also based on the
view that practice informed theory. Progressive legal theory was said to emerge from pro-
gressive political practice. CLS focused on the 'doing' rather than just the 'theorizing."'
MINDA, supra note 15, at 112; see also DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983)(offering pro-
posals for challenging hegemony at law schools); Duncan Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS: A
Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1013 (1985)(discussing CLS
activism in law schools and proposing a greater role for clinical programs).
17 See MINDA, supra note 15, at 106. For a general history of CLS scholarship, see
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed., 1992); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRES-
SIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982); Duncan Kennedy & Karl Klare, Bibliography of
Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A
Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
18 James Boyle, Introduction, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 17, at xliv.
[Vol. 5:95
Creating True Believers
scholars conceived their role as offering not merely a theory of law,
but a "politically active, socially responsible" view of being a lawyer.19
The theory in fact espoused by CLS is notoriously difficult to de-
fine, and as Mark Tushnet has noted, critical theory is less an intellec-
tual movement than it is a political location.20 Some principles can be
discerned, however. First is the indeterminacy of legal doctrine, so
that any legal principle can yield contradictory results. Given that law
is indeterminate, predictors of results can be traced to identifying
what entrenched economic and social institutions benefit from a deci-
sion. Legal analysis and culture are designed to disguise the political
content of decision-making and legitimate political results. The cul-
ture of law works to mystify and disempower outsiders through the
use of abstract professional legal discourse. Traditional liberal legal
thought, with its rights-based focus, privileges the values of individual
autonomy and self-interest over community and connection, so that
liberal law reform efforts result only in the perpetuation of the status
quo.21
Critical scholars also look at how legal education worked to sup-
port the hegemony of traditional legal theory. Law school is part of
the mystification process, in that it de-emphasizes the moral and polit-
ical content of law, and seeks to explain judicial decision-making as an
objective rational exercise, rather than a smokescreen for disguising
rule indeterminacy. Law students are trained to function as legal tech-
nicians, with the expertise necessary to make "right" decisions for
their clients. CLS trained lawyers, on the other hand, see their role as
empowering clients to challenge the alleged objectivity of the legal
system. 22
Critical jurisprudence also finds expression in feminist legal the-
ory, critical race theory, and queer theory. These movements are al-
ternatively viewed as off-shoots of CLS or independent schools of
legal thought that changed the focus of CLS. In either case, by the
late 1980s, critical scholarship had shifted to some degree from exclu-
sively economic analysis to the exploration of how issues of race, gen-
Boyle notes that the very ability of CLS to speak to practitioners may account for the rise
of CLS. See id.
19 Id. at xliv.
20 Tushnet, supra note 17, at 1515. For Tushnet, a "political location" is "a place where
people with a wide but not unlimited range of political views come together for political
education, sustenance, and activity." Id. at 1515 n.2.
21 See MINDA, supra note 15, at 113; Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and
Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 369, 374 (1982-83).
22 See MINDA, supra note 15, at 110-14; Gabel & Harris, supra note 21; William H.




der, and sexuality determine legal outcomes.23 Feminist jurisprudence
looks primarily at women's experience to expose how the law has sys-
temically privileged masculine normative visions. Thus, a basic tenet
of feminist legal theory is the importance of personal narrative in chal-
lenging the dominant discourse. Telling the stories of women's lives
exposes the patriarchal assumptions inherent in doctrine. 24 Among
the most significant perspectives to emerge from this methodology is
cultural feminism, which emphasizes the value that women attach to
the morality of relationship and connection, as compared to autonomy
and individuality. Cultural feminists suggest that these values have
long been disregarded by liberal legal theory, resulting in a body of
doctrine that disempowers women and fails to protect their interests.25
Radical feminist theory takes a different analysis, viewing gender ine-
quality in law as the result of a systematic attempt to maintain the
subordination of women, and a reflection of a social construction of
sexuality designed to perpetuate male dominance.26 Both schools rec-
23 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal
Education, or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988). See also
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (developing a "Black feminist criticism" by exploring the "ten-
dency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis"
and marking this tendency in antidiscrimination law, feminist theory and antiracist poli-
tics); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989)(discussing the need for "counterstorytelling" by "outgroups" to
challenge dominant narratives and ideology); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians
and Gay Men, 46 U. MiAMi L. REV. 511 (1992)(suggesting that gay rights advocates should
seek to counter myths about gay lifestyles and identities and should employ a gender-based
legal theory to further gay rights).
24 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 87
(1989)(arguing that feminist narratives "moved the reference point for truth and thereby
the definition of reality as such"); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 971, 975 (1991)("The ostensible 'neutrality' of the law disguises the extent to which it
is premised on the perspectives of the powerful; the narratives of those who occupy a
comparatively powerless position are not only evidence of what has been excluded, but
testimony to the law's relentless perspectivity."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 63 (1988)(arguing that "the narrative and phenomenological task for
the critique of patriarchal jurisprudence is to tell the story and phenomenology of the
human community's commitment to the Rule of Law from women's point of view").
25 Robin West summarizes cultural feminist thought as follows:
Because women are connected with the rest of human life, intimacy with the "other"
comes naturally. Caring, nurturance, and an ethic of love and responsibility for life is
second nature. Autonomy, or freedom from the other, constitutes a value for men
because it reflects an existential state of being: separate. Intimacy is a value for
women because it reflects an existentially connected state of being.
West, supra note 24, at 18. Carol Gilligan's book IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) is consid-
ered a "seminal" work of cultural feminism.
26 While cultural feminism celebrates women's connectedness to the other as evidenced
by women's morality of care, nurturing, and intimacy, radical feminism views this same
[Vol. 5:95
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ognize the importance of listening to women's voices, however, and
both diverge somewhat from the CLS mainstream in that they main-
tain a connection to liberal reformist idea of transforming doctrine to
actually reflect women's voices. 27 The emerging postmodern feminist
theorists believe, on the other hand, that gender equality must begin
from the destabilization of gender identity, and a recognition of the
falseness and essentialism of binary thinking.28
Critical race theory seeks to expose the fact that racism is deeply
ingrained in our legal culture. The formal equality supposedly dic-
tated by our current laws does little to confront everyday manifesta-
tion of discrimination, and, in fact, is constructed to preclude any
rapid destabilizing change in racial hierarchy. In exploring new vi-
sions of racial justice, critical race theorists rely on narrative and
storytelling to demonstrate the false promise of our civil rights laws.
In addition, they seek to demonstrate that normative discourse of civil
rights is highly fact sensitive, and, therefore, neutral principles like
formal equality can work as a hindrance in the search for racial justice.
A color-blind meritocracy favors the interests of the white majority
because it fails to recognize the racial hierarchy of our society.29
connectedness as "the source of women's debasement, powerlessness, subjugation, and
misery." West, supra note 24, at 83. "Invasion and intrusion, rather than intimacy, nur-
turance and care, is the 'unofficial' story of women's subjective experience of connection."
Id. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 427 (D. Kelly Weis-
berg ed., 1993)(proposing a trajectory for radical feminist theory).
27 See MINDA, supra note 15, at 141-48 (noting that both cultural and radical feminism
"tend to focus on a single understanding of women's experience" which needs to be articu-
lated in order to insert woman's voice into the dominant ideology). While cultural femi-
nism proposes that feminists must "expand the understanding of human development by
using the group left out in the construction of theory to call attention what is missing in its
account," GILLIGAN, supra note 25, at 4, MacKinnon writes: "Take your foot off our necks,
then we will hear in what tongue women speak." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 26, at 277.
28 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN-
TITY (1990)(exploring the performativity of gender identity and politics). Some have ques-
tioned whether gender identity can be destabilized without historicizing the category of
"experience," which is itself grounded in empiricism and liberal theory. See Joan W. Scott,
"Experience," in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 33 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott
eds., 1992)("It ought to be possible for historians to, in Gayatri Spivak's terms, 'make visi-
ble the assignment of subject-positions,' not in the sense of capturing the reality of the
objects seen, but of trying to understand the operations of the complex and changing dis-
cursive processes by which identities are ascribed, resisted, or embraced and which
processes themselves are unremarked, indeed achieve their effect because they aren't no-
ticed." (citing GAYATRI SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITIcs 241
(1987)).
29 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995)(collecting various works of Critical Race Theory).
As Critical Race Theorists have exposed the problems of color-blind ideology, policy
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Queer theory questions how sexual identity should be conceptu-
alized. 30 While the range of "queer theories" is diverse,31 two strains
of thought, often in conflict, seem to predominate. One approach
posits fixed and stable gay and lesbian categories of identity. Within
this approach, the goals are to "make visible" the lives of gays and
lesbians, and, within the legal context, to analyze the effect of law on
lesbians and gay men and combat discriminatory legal doctrine. 32 Al-
ternatively, constructivists show how sexual identities are constructed
rather than revealed, and suggest that there are not homosexual or
heterosexual categories of identity apart from language and culture.33
Queer theory also deconstructs the categorical opposition between
homosexuality and heterosexuality, thus destabilizing cultural gender
and sexuality norms.
The reaction of the legal world to critical legal theory is instruc-
tive in understanding the relationship between theory and practice.
Indeed, examining the gulf between the response of progressive prac-
titioners and traditional legal academics forms a starting point in con-
sidering how clinical education finds its theoretical roots in critical
and discourse around affirmative action have also been critiqued because affirmative ac-
tion has functioned to maintain racial hierarchy. Richard Delgado writes:
[Ajffirmative action serves as a homeostatic device, assuring that only a small
number of women and people of color are hired or promoted. Not too many, for
that would be terrifying, nor too few, for that would be destabilizing. Just the right
small number, generally those of us who need it least, are moved ahead .... By
labeling problematic, troublesome, ethically agonizing a paltry system that helps a
few of us get ahead, critics neatly take our eyes off the system of arrangements that
brought and maintained them in power, and enabled them to develop the rules and
standards of quality and merit that now exclude us, make us appear unworthy, de-
pendent (naturally) on affirmative action.
Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to
Be a Role Model?, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra, at 356.
30 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the
Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833 (1993)(examining the conflicts between essen-
tialist and constructivist movements within queer theory).
31 For a general background in queer theory, see THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993); INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEo-
RIES (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
32 William Rubenstine has compiled a thorough casebook on the contemporary status
of gays and lesbians in the law. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTINE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1997).
33 See Ortiz, supra note 30, at 1836-37 ("To constructivists, the gay identity category
reflects not only late nineteenth-century Euro-American attitudes toward family, gender,
and sexuality, but also attitudes towards economic organization and medical science.").
Constructivists derive much of their scholarship from Michel Foucault's "History of Sexu-
ality" and from Eve Sedgwick. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Rob-
ert Hurley trans. 1978); EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET
(1990). Nan Hunter and William Eskridge have recently written a casebook which tends
toward the constructivist approach. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & NAN D. HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW (1997).
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theory. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present, CLS
scholarship has been heatedly attacked, with a force that appears out
of proportion to the content of the actual critique. In numerous arti-
cles, leaders of the legal academy have accused the Crits of "nihilism"
and suggested that those who teach from a critical perspective are vio-
lating their ethical duties as law teachers to support the "rule of
law."'34 Another branch of criticism has labeled critical scholarship as
useless to practitioners and judges.35 The narrative focus common to
the various critical schools has been attacked as lacking analysis and
failing to shed light on "objective truths. '36 Finally, the Crits have
been generally denounced as unintelligible, incomprehensible, unpro-
fessional, immoral, and just plain uncivil. 37 At some institutions, these
critiques have resulted in serious tenure wars. 38
It has been suggested that the discourse over critical scholarship
is simply an example of a traditional academic interchange: the older
generation fighting off the "Young Turks" to preserve its territory in
the academy. 39 Indeed, there is little question that the Oedipal drama
34 See MINDA, supra note 15, at 123-24; Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984)(arguing that law teachers who "embrace nihilism ... [have]
an ethical duty to depart the law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the acad-
emy"); Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L. &
Soc'y REV. 697 (1992)(arguing that CLS scholars do not offer a positive or constructive
critique of legal doctrine); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332
(1986)(arguing that CLS scholars are legal nihilists).
35 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit states:
many "elite" law faculties ... have significant contingents of "impractical" scholars,
who are "disdainful of the practice of law." The "impractical" scholar ... produces
abstract scholarship that has little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete
issues in a wholly theoretical manner. As a consequence, it is my impression that
judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have little use for much of the
scholarship that is now produced by members of the academy.
Id. at 35.
36 See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 854 (1993)("A legal story without analysis is much
like a judicial opinion with 'Findings of Fact' but no 'Conclusion of Law."').
37 See Carrington, supra note 34 (questioning the CLS commitment to the legal profes-
sion); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 110 (1986)(stating that CLS
critiques are "unappealing and politically irresponsible" because they fail to suggest an
alternative vision of law).
38 See Boyle, supra note 18, at xl ("Recent years have seen well-publicized denials of
tenure to academics who espoused feminist and CLS ideas, together with an apparent re-
laxation of scholarly standards for anyone who wishes to suggest that critical legal scholars
are nihilists, fascists, Marxists or (more mysteriously) all three.").
39 Gary Minda aptly describes this scenario as follows:
History indicates that when a new theory or paradigm appears to challenge the view
and methods of an established theory or paradigm, a crisis in confidence emerges,
provoking a response from the mainstream. The reason is clear. Professional repu-
tations and careers are at stake; the old guard must hold off the challenge posed by
the "Young Turks" in order to maintain their status and privilege.
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partially accounts for the degree of rancor in the debate, but its vehe-
mence is particularly startling when compared to the reaction of prac-
titioners exposed to critical theory. Since practitioners rarely grace
the academic journals with theoretical critique, I rely here on subjec-
tive and anecdotal evidence. It is my sense, however, that many liti-
gators, and certainly most progressive lawyers, find the basic tenets of
critical legal thought, when stripped of its jargon, self-evident and
rather obvious. Yes, law is indeterminate; otherwise why would so
many disputes end in litigation? Yes, the law favors entrenched eco-
nomic interests; any lawyer involved in products liability or securities
class action litigation experiences this on an everyday basis. Yes, the
legal system has difficulty understanding "outsider narratives"; ask
any legal services or civil rights lawyer.40 This is, of course, a vastly
over-simplified version of CLS, but for the practicing legal commu-
nity, it might be said that the academic debate over the place of this
scholarship is much ado about nothing.
III. A CLINICAL HISTORY
Clinical teachers represent either the most introspective segment
of the practicing bar, or the most practically oriented of the academy,
or both. From the beginning of clinical education to the present, our
ranks are largely populated by those who share a progressive political
outlook. We have largely chosen to devote our professional careers
not only to teaching but to representing clients who cannot afford pri-
vate counsel. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that clinicians have
either independently come to the same conclusions as CLS scholars,
or consciously or unconsciously absorbed the basic tenets of CLS, and
incorporated them into their teaching and lawyering theory. What we
have not done is be explicit about the theory behind our teaching.
The history of modern clinical legal education has been explored
MINDA, supra note 15, at 208. I use the term "Young Thrks" with some hesitation, given
that it most probably has some unfortunate essentialist genesis.
40 See generally Abrams, supra note 24, at 971 (exploring the challenges that feminist
narratives present to the legal system and modern legal theory). Abrams argues that the
lack of public debate on feminist narrative has contributed to misunderstandings about its
purpose and integrity. Abrams writes:
many mainstream scholars continue to voice doubts about feminist narratives. What
is particularly troubling about such doubts is that they have rarely been voiced in
public-either in spoken or published form-but have surfaced in coffeepot discus-
sions, and in the deliberations of appointments committees. . . . The public silence
that has met feminist narrative scholarship may be sufficient to persuade those with
limited exposure to the form that it is sufficiently flawed, or sufficiently marginal, as




at length in clinical scholarship. 41 To summarize briefly, law students'
demands for a more relevant education in the late 1960s led to infor-
mal externship relationships with legal services and public interest or-
ganizations. At the same time, the Ford Foundation began to funnel
money into the law schools for clinical programs in order to increase
the availability of and consciousness about legal services for the
poor.42 Staff lawyers hired by the law schools to run the programs
began their long and continuing fight to achieve academic status and
parity.43 Not coincidentally, clinical teachers moved away from their
original service focus, and started to use the clinic as a laboratory for
thinking about lawyering skills, and in turn to produce scholarship
about it, in part to legitimize their place in the law schools. Meltsner
and Schrag appeared in 1974;44 Binder and Price in 1977;4 5 Bellow and
Moulton in 1978;46 Shaffer and Redmount in 1980;47 Fisher and Ury in
41 See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 7; William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching
for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463
(1995); Richard A. Rosen, Clinical Legal Education, 73 N.C. L. REV. 749 (1995); Nina W.
Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education, 37 How. L.J. 31 (1993); Panel Discussion,
Clinical Legal Education: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Fu-
ture, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 337 (1987). See also Bellow & Johnson, supra note 7; Gorman,
supra note 7; George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 162 (1974); Allen Redlich, Perceptions of a Clinical Program, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 574 (1971); Arthur B. LaFrance, Clinical Education: "To Turn Ideals into Effective
Vision," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 624 (1971).
42 See Kotkin, supra note 7, at 190-91. The Ford Foundation created the Council on
Legal Education and Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) in the late 1960s. CLEPR
funds enabled the development of programs that would provide legal services to the poor
through the academic community. Although CLEPR initially envisioned that law school
professors and students would contribute to the work-force of legal services offices,
CLEPR quickly evolved into a funder of the first in-house clinical programs.
43 See Margaret Martin Barry, A Question of Mission: Catholic Law School's Domestic
Violence Clinic, 38 How. L.J. 135, 161 n.53 (1994)("Clinicians have had to struggle for
every step forward, as the mainstream of legal education had trouble appreciating the
value of clinics."); Gerald P. L6pez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically
and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 319
(1989)(outlining the typical complaints law schools make about clinical programs). For
many years, clinical teachers were not viewed as law school faculty and often received
lower pay, status, and title. See Kotkin, supra note 7, at 191. Clinicians tend to improve
their status at the law school by teaching traditional courses in addition to clinical pro-
grams. See Barry, supra at 161 n.54.
44 MICHAEL MELTSNER & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY, MATERI-
ALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1974). See also MICHAEL MELTSNER & PHILIP G.
SCHRAG, TOWARD SIMULATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL COURSE IN
PRETRIAL LITIGATION (1979); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report from a
CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1976); Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag,
Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978).
45 DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
46 GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).
47 THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUN-
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1981.48 The first law review symposium on clinical education was pub-
lished in 1980;4 9 the first official AALS Clinical Teacher's Conference
occurred in 1979.50 In 1983, clinical teachers' demands for academic
status were recognized in part when the ABA enacted a law school
accreditation standard requiring some form of job security for "skills
teachers." 51 Despite this official recognition, clinical scholarship was,
and to some extent continues to be, so devalued by traditional teach-
ers that, unlike critical scholarship, it has been largely ignored, rather
than challenged, in academic discourse. 52 Many clinical teachers felt
SELING (1980).
48 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHoUT GIVING IN (1981).
49 Symposium: Clinical Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
1 (1980).
50 For the following information, I was indebted to Sandy Ogilvy, the historian for the
AALS Section on Clinical Legal Education. After the Snowmass, Colorado program in
June 1979, the AALS Clinical Section was created in 1980 by vote of the AALS Executive
Committee. Prior to the Snowmass program, CLEPR and its predecessor organizations
sponsored a series of conferences and workshops between 1959 and 1973. In June 1973,
CLEPR held a seminar event at Buck Hill Falls, Pennsylvania. This conference produced a
book of essays and a book of proceedings. See CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STu-
DENT: LEGAL EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETT-ING (1973) (Working Papers for CLEPR
National Conference); CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT: CLEPR CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS (1973).
51 When enacted, ABA Standard 405(c) (then 405(e)) stated: "A law school should
afford to full-time faculty members whose primary responsibilities are in its professional
skills program a form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure and perquisites
reasonably similar to those provided other full-time faculty members .... " AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS,
Standard 405(c) (1995). In 1996, the ABA revised the standard:
A law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of
position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites reasonably
similar to those provided other full-time faculty members. A law school may require
these faculty members to meet standards and obligations reasonably similar to those
required of other full-time faculty members. However, this Standard does not pre-
clude a limited number of fixed, short-term appointments in a clinical program
predominantly staffed by full-time faculty members, or in an experimental program
of limited duration.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTER-
PRETATIONS, Standard 405(c)(1996). The new standard is mandatory and specifically al-
lows schools to hire short-term, non-tenure track staff.
The entire history of the 405(e) fight is contained in Roy Stuckey's file cabinet. See E-
mail from Roy Stuckey to the author, Sept. 9, 1997 (on file with author).
52 See John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must
Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 343 (1989)(arguing that the focus
on the production of legal scholarship from law school faculty has led law schools to ne-
glect their duty to provide students with practical training in lawyering). Clinical scholar-
ship is so devalued that the in the late 1980s the chair of the AALS Professional
Development Committee warned new law teachers that their careers will be at risk if they
write clinical articles on lawyering skills because such writing is not considered to be good
scholarship. See id. at 350 n.21; Mary Kay Kane, Some Thoughts on Scholarship for Begin-
ning Teachers, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 17-18 (1987).
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compelled to write doctrinal scholarship if they hoped to get tenure,
and for those who pursued their true interests, tenure battles rivaled
those faced by the Crits.
V. FROM SKILLS TO MICRO THEORY TO MACRO THEORY
The parallel developments in clinical thought and critical thought
are not coincidental. They grew out of the same zeitgeist, and were
spearheaded by young lawyers-some more academically inclined
than others-who came of age in the 1960s and approached law from
considerations of its potential for social change. With some notable
exceptions,5 3 and most probably for reasons of academic hierarchy,
however, clinical teachers and critical theorists have never quite found
common cause or joined forces, either with regard to academic poli-
tics, or to integrating their theoretical perspectives. 54
In this section, I look at several skills and attempt to analyze
them using micro and macro theory. As I suggested earlier, this ap-
proach may help to enrich clinical teaching. But I view this exercise as
a two-way street. Critical scholarship would be similarly enriched by
translating the theory into thoughts about new ways of lawyering.
Almost every clinical teacher devotes some attention to inter-
viewing skills. The basic approach that most use starts from the prop-
osition that the client needs to provide her lawyer with a full factual
picture and to articulate the result she seeks. To accomplish these
goals, we teach students interviewing skills: "structure the interview to
begin with an identification of the problem; ask open-ended questions
to obtain a chronological narrative; then work on theory development
to gather legally critical and detailed information." 55 To supplement
these structuring skills, we teach ways of "encouraging clients to be
active participants in the description and resolution of their
problems: '5 6 identifying facilitators and inhibitors to direct communi-
cation; promoting empathic communication and non-judgmental ap-
proaches; engaging in "active listening"; and formulating effective
questions.
The explanations that we offer for both our interviewing goals
and the techniques we teach are largely founded upon principles of
53 See supra note 14 (referring to clinical writers who have employed critical scholar-
ship to elucidate lawyering models).
54 See Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 1600-05 (stating that although the methodologies of
clinical legal education and feminist jurisprudence are compatible, "the movements have
worked independently, not collaboratively"). Goldfarb argues that feminism and clinical
education should draw from each other because "such cross-fertilization would enhance
the quality and contribution of each." Id. at 1605.
55 BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note 9.
56 Id. at 32.
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legal ethics and instrumental lessons from psychological theory.57
Thus, because the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules
of Professional Conduct require that clients make the decisions about
their legal matters, we must make sure to elicit their preferred resolu-
tion. Because psychologists have demonstrated the importance of em-
pathy and active listening, we use those techniques to motivate our
clients to provide a full factual picture. The two major texts on inter-
viewing-Binder, Bergman and Price,58 and Bastress and Har-
baugh59-explore psychology and ethics, to somewhat varying
degrees, as the foundation for the skills presented.
Nowhere in either text, however, is there any mention of the
political underpinnings of our interviewing goals and skills, which I
sense most clinical teachers share, or their relationship to legal theory
and critical jurisprudence. And even if we see and understand these
connections, I, at least, rarely make them explicit in the classroom or
in student supervision. The connections need to be articulated, both
to ourselves and to our students.
For example, we should not encourage empathic listening simply
because psychologists have shown that it motivates clients to speak
freely. Rather, to the extent that we are representing those tradition-
ally disempowered in the legal system, our clients deserve and require
our true-not our instrumental-empathy. It is not untypical for our
client interactions to be preceded by a long history of non-empathy:
bureaucratic nightmares in the social service system; visits to lawyers
who dismiss their claims and concerns; negative rulings at lower ad-
ministrative levels. I often wonder at the strength of our clients to
pursue their claims at all. If we are to be the most effective advocates
for these clients, we need to have true empathy for their situations,
and to understand how the law works to dissuade them from pursuing
and asserting their rights.
Similarly, using open ended questions is an effective way of elicit-
ing a full narrative, which is useful in gaining a broad factual picture
and not missing critical chronology or details. But narrative serves
other functions as well. Critical feminist and race theorists teach us
that some narratives hold out the promise of changing the law.60
57 Indeed, Bastress and Harbaugh devote several chapters to psychological theory, as
do Binder, Bergman and Price (who is a clinical professor of psychology), although less
explicitly denominated as such. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 10.
58 BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note 9.
59 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 10.
60 Perhaps the most obvious example is the development of the law of sexual harass-
ment, which grew directly out of Catharine MacKinnon's stories of workplace behavior.
See CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); CATH-
ARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
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Thus, we need to obtain the broadest possible narrative and to explore
it the context of our clients' lives if we are to utilize narrative's poten-
tial to make the legal system more responsive to our clients' goals, as
well as to the overarching goal of creating a legal system that better
serves other than economic interests. Critical scholarship can provide
the foundation for communicating to our students these macro
theories.
Many of the same goals and techniques come into play when we
teach counseling, but here the emphasis is less on fact development
and more on "client centered decisionmaking" and considerations of
importance of non-legal consequences in reaching decisions. This is
the skill that I have the least faith in my ability to effectively teach in a
way that makes a lasting difference in how students will practice law.
To me, it is the most counter-intuitive skill and the one that most
clearly departs from popular culture norms. It is here that we most
often hear, "but, in the real world . .. ."
What do we offer as the theory underlying our counseling model,
arguably the most significant contribution of clinical teaching to
changing the way law is practiced? The most obvious micro theory
relates to ethical considerations: according to the Code and Rules,
decisionmaking is the client's province. Surprisingly, however, neither
commonly used counseling text devotes more than a passing reference
to this rationale for the models they advocate. Indeed, hardly any ra-
tionale-let alone theory-is offered at all. Bastress and Harbaugh
address counseling largely from a psychological perspective, and
rather than provide theory to support their model, they focus upon
the barriers that interfere with lawyers' ability to respect their clients'
wishes.61 Binder, Bergman, and Price are more eclectic, but provide
only a passing reference to anything resembling theory. In a one-
page section entitled, "The Advantages of a Client-Centered Ap-
proach," the authors first offer the instrumental rational: "Active cli-
ent participation enhances the likelihood of producing satisfactory
resolutions." They then add:
Moreover, active client participation respects the autonomy of the
person who "owns" the problem. A client does not lose the right to
make decisions which are likely to have a substantial impact on his
or her life for having sought legal assistance. 62
End of theory. No wonder our students resist our counseling models.
In fact, counseling is the skill that most lends itself to exploration
through macro theory. The first foundation for the client-centered
model is alluded to above. Critical scholarship has explored in depth
61 BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 10 (chapters 1, 2, 8, 12 and 13).
62 BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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issues of client autonomy, and narratives demonstrating its signifi-
cance are a common feature of these pieces: "Mrs. G." is the classic
example. 63
Another aspect of counseling, however, has not been frequently
connected to theory, but should be. Why do we emphasize the impor-
tance of considering non-legal consequences? We tell our students,
"Because they are important to people-sometimes more important
than the legal result." What we are really putting forward is a basic
tenet of critical theory: people are different from one other. Specifi-
cally, issues of economics, race, class, religion, gender, and sexual ori-
entation may well affect how our clients perceive the law and its
ability to achieve the results they seek.
To use a simplistic example, in a sexual harassment case, a single
mother on public assistance may be anxious to accept a quick settle-
ment, when our students believe that she could obtain much more at
trial. On the other hand, an African-American office worker in an
action charging discriminatory promotion policies may not wish to ac-
cept a generous settlement, when it means that he will not have his
day in court. Clinical teachers can describe endless variations on this
theme, as well as their difficulties in teaching students to put client-
centered decisionmaking into practice. The macro theory of "differ-
ence" would give students a richer foundation from which to appreci-
ate why clients may come to different decisions than they would in
similar circumstances, and help them to respect those decisions.
This same micro-macro analysis can be applied to our teaching of
case theory, in which we attempt to convince our students that they
need to develop a consistent and integrated factual and legal story
that both makes sense and makes out a claim. Why? The micro the-
ory we offer is that a well-developed case theory makes for effective
planning, fact investigation, and oral advocacy. I see the macro theory
as two-fold. First, case theory that effectively conveys the stories of
disempowered clients is probably the most important factor in chang-
ing the law to better recognize those clients' interests. Witness how
sexual harassment came to be recognized as a form of gender discrimi-
nation. 64 Second, on a even more macro level, we should ask our-
selves why case theory is so important if the legal decisionmaking is
controlled by precedent: the facts either make out a claim or they
don't. Indeed, the critical importance of case theory in litigation dem-
onstrates the basic tenet of classic CLS theory: the law is not fixed and
its indeterminacy generally works to support entrenched interests.
63 See Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
64 See note 60 supra.
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As to negotiation, many clinical teachers advocate the problem
solving and principled bargaining approaches that Fisher and Ury
popularized. Here, Getting to Yes is brief, but explicit about the micro
theory: "Principled negotiation shows you how to obtain what you are
entitled to and still be decent. It enables you to be fair while protect-
ing you against those who would take advantage of your fairness. '65
The authors also emphasize the importance of communication, of
maintaining relationships, and of actually being fair.66 Here, in fact,
the micro theory come close to the macro theory: feminist jurispru-
dence suggests that the law would profit from these same lessons.
V. A NOTE TO THE SKEPTICS
I imagine that, by now, many readers are thinking something
along the following lines. "That's all we need-trying to cram critical
legal theory down our students' throats. They don't even read the
assigned skills material half of the time. And I can't read that stuff
myself. Besides, why should we try to impose our political values on
our students? That's not what clinical teaching is about. The students
will resent it terribly and we'll get another round of 'political correct-
ness' complaints. They are here to learn skills and that's what we
should be teaching. Besides, they're all going off to be corporate law-
yers, anyway. What relevance does a theory of lawyering for poor
people have for them?" Here are my responses.
If you can't read it, don't assign it. There is no question that
much of early critical scholarship suffered from extreme unintelligibil-
ity, and some postmodern theory still is inaccessible to me without
devoting more time than I'm willing to invest. On the other hand,
there is a wealth of scholarship that is truly entertaining, inspiring, and
eminently readable. What could be more engaging than Lucie
White's Mrs. G/Sunday Shoes,67 Gerry L6pez's Seven Weeks article, 68
or Herb Eastman's Speaking Truth to Power?69 Just as in choosing
our skills reading, we need to select carefully our legal theory
materials.
As to "political correctness" and teaching values, this issue has
been the subject of some debate in the clinical community and there
65 FISHER & URY, supra note 11, at xviii.
66 For example, Fisher and Ury suggest that negotiators should create options for mu-
tual gain and distinguish individuals from conflicts, and that negotiators should be "hard on
the merits, soft on the people." Id. at xviii, 56.
67 White, supra note 63.
68 Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989).
69 Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Liti-
gators, 104 YALE L.J. 763 (1995).
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are legitimate arguments on both sides.70 I offer my viewpoint, how-
ever, that whether or not we try to, we teach values and politics, al-
most by definition. Teaching must, to a greater or lesser degree,
encompass the communication of values, which in turn implicate poli-
tics. In clinical teaching, values and politics are perhaps as close to
the surface as in any place in the legal academy, since we confront real
life situations that cannot help but raise these issues. The risk that we
face is not being explicit about what we teach. In my experience, stu-
dents do not object to-and in fact appreciate-learning about a
clinical teacher's political understanding of the law, as long as it is
made clear that there is room for other views and no one will be si-
lenced in the classroom. What students do have trouble with-and
rightfully so-is an implicit and unarticulated political "agenda" in the
classroom. When it is unspoken, students may become resentful and
reticent to voice opposing ideas. This is the risk when we do not artic-
ulate legal theory in our clinical teaching.
And if our students disagree with critical theory? As discussed
earlier,71 they will not be alone. But isn't that what academic dialogue
is supposed to be about? I, for one, would rather discuss in class
whether the law consciously supports entrenched economic interests
and how case theory can be used creatively to help decisionmakers
take cognizance of other interests, than whether open-ended ques-
tions really produce more information than the check-list approach to
interviewing. Students will remember more about, and take more se-
riously, our skills training if it is put in a theoretical context, even one
with which they disagree.
Finally, what is the relevance of critical theory to the corporate
lawyers of tomorrow? The skills we teach make for better lawyering
for all clients, whether they are corporate CEO's or evicted tenants.
The CEO will respond better to empathy than to judgment. An anti-
trust action needs a case theory as much as a discrimination claim. If,
as I posit, macro theory helps students to understand micro theory, we
will have succeeded in becoming better teachers for all of our stu-
dents. But a true Crit, and some clinical teachers, might well respond
that we should not be providing ammunition in the form of skills to
the corporate bar. Indeed, we should not be empathizing with the
CEO, as he explains why he was justified in laying off older workers
or dumping sludge in the river. Nor should we blithely apply client
centered decisionmaking without reference to moral content. Unfor-
tunately, I have no completely satisfactory answer to this concern. It
70 Teaching values was the subject of the 1998 AALS Conference on Clinical Legal
Education.
71 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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is a conundrum with which all progressive law teachers-traditional
and clinical-must come to terms. Moreover, it is probably the one
area that has produced a dialogue between and among critical and
clinical scholars. William Simon,72 Steve Ellmann, 73 and others have
challenged the legitimacy of strict adherence to client centeredness.
At the very least, then, these issues should provide fruitful grounds for
class discussion.
V. CONCLUSION: CREATING TRUE BELIEVERS
My aim in this article is to help clinical teachers to create "true
believers" in both the skills we teach and in the values that underlie
them. We need true believers if we are to begin to accomplish what I
view as the major goal of clinical legal education: ultimately to change
the way that law is practiced, and the way the legal system relates to
our clients, as well as the way our clients relate to the law. Adding
macro theory to our teaching may be one way to make progress to-
ward that goal, and to give some content to the idea of critical
lawyering.
72 See William Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.
L. REV. 213 (1991).
73 See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987).
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